The fall of Assad-regime has given birth to antagonisms amongst its earlier allies like Iran, Turkey, and Russia. On the other hand, the leverage gained by Israel does not augur well for the region, writes Asad Mirza.
Asad Mirza
The striking developments in Syria over the past 13 days leading to the rapid fall of the Assad regime have transfixed the world. Thousands are already trying to make their way back to Syria after years in exile. It turns out the answer to the refugee crisis that sent millions of Syrians into neighbouring countries and Europe may simply be the removal of a murderous dictator. Though in reality during recent months, more countries were trying to normalise ties with Assad. Italy even sent an ambassador back to Damascus.
However, the Syrian situation and a decrease of Iran’s influence in Syria may have profound implications for the middle east’s geopolitical landscape, power dynamics, and strategic alignments.
Regional actors including Iran, Turkey, and the Persian Gulf states may compete to find a toehold during the transitional period in Syria to realign their efforts to safeguard their regional interests. Saudi Arabia and the UAE, through calculated engagement with the diverse Syrian political factions and reconstruction efforts may attempt to gain leverage by trying to counter Turkish and Iranian aspirations.
Moreover, the turmoil in Syria could also exacerbate sectarian tensions as Sunni Arab states may seek to prevent Iran from regaining influence, while various militant groups, including the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) could try to rebuild their operational presence in the region.
The Syrian conflict is now proving to be the Achilles heel of the Iranian axis. An ally of the Islamic Republic since its founding in 1979, the Assad regime called on Tehran to help quash the uprising. Hezbollah deployed thousands of men in Syria, transforming from a Lebanese political party and militant group into an Iranian expeditionary force. But Hezbollah’s fighting in the open in Syria for a decade exposed it to Israeli surveillance.
This helped Israel’s recent military campaign, which decimated the group’s leadership and destroyed much of its capabilities. Iran’s hubris grew as it added another Arab capital under its control. But helping Damascus also stretched Tehran’s capabilities, siphoned off resources and exposed its vulnerabilities.
Meanwhile, Israel may take more assertive positions against Iran-affiliated organisations in the region, including Lebanese resistance groups active in Syria, with the aim to prevent Tehran from reconstituting its sphere of influence in Israel’s north.
The list of challenges for Syria is long, including deep apprehensions about rebel group Hayat Tahrir al-Sham’s (HTS) vision for the future, the possibility of violent retributions after five decades of oppression and the danger of a resurgence of Isis. Syrians do not need to be reminded of this, instead an end to foreign meddling in the country is the need of the hour, but no regional player is going to exercised constraint.
The sudden collapse of Bashar Assad’s regime in Syria changed the geopolitical landscape of the Middle East overnight. Iran and Turkey, who for years maintained a delicate geopolitical balance, are now faced with competing interests in a post-Assad Syria.
Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei, has accused the United States, Israel, and Turkey of trying to overthrow the Assad’s government in Syria. He claims this is part of a joint “American-Zionist” plan, with Turkey also involved. These developments also highlight the complex geopolitical situation of the region.
He further stressed the importance of helping Syria in this challenging time. The situation remains tense as these accusations unfold. Despite years of collaboration – particularly on Turkey’s economic support to circumvent international sanctions on Iran – relations between Iran and Turkey appear to be tattering.
Turkey has long provided support for anti-Assad rebel groups, including the HTS which led the march to Damascus. However, Turkey’s primary interest in Syria has been to create a buffer zone and a bridgehead to fight Kurdish groups in northern Syria.
In post-Assad Syria, Turkey ultimately wants to prevent Kurdish interests from taking root in a new Syrian government.
Henri J Barkey, an adjunct senior fellow for Middle East studies at the US Council on Foreign Relations, wrote in a recent article that the “single most crucial aim” for Turkey in Syria remains the eradication of the Syrian Kurdish group, the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF).
Barkey said Turkey fears that “Syrian Kurds would cut a deal with any central government in Damascus to achieve an autonomous status just like Iraqi Kurds did following the Iraq war.”
For Iran, the Assad regime was a critical strategic ally in the Middle East, and as Turkey is poised to gain influence, Iran’s ability to project power in the region has been steadily diminishing.
Ahmad Vakhshiteh, a senior lecturer at RUDN University in Moscow, told Deutsch Welle he believes that recent developments in Syria have shifted the balance of power in Turkey’s favour. Vakhshiteh told DW that Ankara could capitalise on Tehran’s current vulnerabilities to advance its wider and complex geopolitical aims.
This includes support for a land corridor connecting the land-locked Azerbaijani exclave Nakhchivan to Azerbaijan. Nakhchivan borders both Turkey and Iran. Turkey is in favour of the land corridor that would connect it with Turkic regions. Iran has raised concerns that Azerbaijan could use it to block Iran’s access to Armenia.
For years, Turkey has been a critical partner in helping Iran circumvent international sanctions over Tehran’s nuclear programme. Along with the UAE, Turkey has facilitated trade and provided essential goods to Iran.
Official data from Iran’s customs authority revealed that trade volume between the two countries reached approximately $10 billion in the first ten months of this year, with ambitions to triple this figure within five years. However, escalating tensions could threaten this economic lifeline.
In this background, the Western alliance, led by the US and European nations, may intensify their strategic involvement, at a later stage, if not imminently, through coordinated diplomatic channels and measured interventions.
Such engagement will serve the West’s dual objectives of preventing the reemergence of non-state militant organisations, while limiting Russian and Iranian strategic expansion in the Mediterranean region.
Overall, the emerging situation in Syria is not going to straightforward. Assad was able to secure both Turkish and Iranian and some Arab states due to his ability to stop the Israeli troops from advancing into the buffer zone. But with that aim now achieved, Israel may push further to gain control of other crucial areas and may reveal its ultimate plan for the region in the coming days.
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(Asad Mirza is a New Delhi-based senior commentator on national, international, defence and strategic affairs, environmental issues, an interfaith practitioner, and a media consultant. View expressed in this article is his personal)